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COTTON: A CROP IN CRISIS

By Raghav Narsalay
A short case study for Oxfam GB

SUMMARY
India accounts for 16% of global cotton production and is the third largest producer of cotton in the world after the USA and China. Approximately 25% of the world's total cotton area lies in India. Cotton provides a livelihood to more than 60 million people in India, by way of support in agriculture, processing and use of cotton in textiles and garments. It constitutes 29.8% of India's agricultural gross domestic product. Nearly 9 million hectares of land in the country are used to produce 14.2 million bales of cotton lint.

Given that India has the highest surface area under cotton production, one would have expected yields also to be very high. It is here that the sorry story of the Indian cotton farmer begins. With a per hectare yield of around 322 kg, India stands 17th amongst the first 19 major cotton producers of the world.

This paper examines why cotton production in India has failed to reap rich rewards for its cotton farmers. The research centres on the state of Maharashtra, the largest cotton-growing state in the country, which accounts for 17% of total Indian cotton production.

Both domestic and international factors work against India's cotton farmers. Domestically, three factors determine cotton production: the type of seed sown, the market in which the farmer sells his produce, and the price at which he can sell.

ARE HIGH-COST SEEDS THE RIGHT CHOICE?
The most important decision a farmer has to make is choosing the right seed to sow. He can choose from more than 25 varieties of hybrid cotton seed of traditional and improved variety, and over 20-odd local varieties (varieties that have been developed within villages and families, based on the system of local exchange of best seeds). The costs for these range from Rs 65 a bag to Rs 600 a bag for the best variety hybrid seed.

Pest and disease attack can significantly affect yields. Recently, therefore, four varieties of transgenic Bt cotton seed that is resistant to American bollworm -- the most destructive of pests -- have been introduced. Bt seeds cost Rs 1,600 for 450 grams, much more than other varieties. Farmers who can ill afford this high cost are nevertheless buying these seeds in the hope that they will be rid of devastating pests.

The paper argues that in opting for high-cost seeds, farmers are acting out of insufficient knowledge. Though the Genetic Engineering Advisory Committee (GEAC) within the Ministry of Environment and Forests has given its approval to the use of the seeds, it has done so based solely on data furnished by the seed companies. Indian agricultural universities are still conducting trials into claims made in favour of Bt cotton. A report prepared by the Office of the Agriculture Commissioner, Government of Maharashtra, on trials in various locations does not show Bt cotton to have any significant advantage over non-BT varieties. This report has not been widely disseminated.

CHOOSING THE RIGHT MARKET
Cotton farmers face all sorts of restrictions when it comes to selling their produce. Under the Maharashtra Raw Cotton (Procurement, Processing and Marketing) Act 1971 they cannot sell their produce outside the state.

Procurement, processing, storage and sale of cotton are controlled by the Maharashtra State Cooperative Cotton Growers Marketing Federation (MSCCGMF) Ltd, under the Cotton Monopoly Procurement Scheme. While the scheme insulates farmers against price fluctuations, it also constrains them from taking advantage of a higher selling price when demand for cotton exceeds supply in different parts of the country. It is therefore the state and private ginners and traders who benefit from demand-supply mismatches of cotton, and not the farmers.

Indian cotton farmers are shackled when it comes to exports as well. To ensure that cotton is available at a cheap price, especially when cotton prices move northwards, cotton mills' associations lobby the Ministry of Textiles to restrict the export of cotton from India. The suppression of domestic cotton prices over the last two decades is a major reason for stagnating cotton yields in the Indian context.

NO SAY IN PRICE-FIXING
There are three farmers' representatives on the committee within the MSCCGMF that decides prices. These representatives are chosen by the state government. Hence, farmers have hardly any say in what the price of cotton should be.

In 1997-98, the government suddenly slashed import duty on raw cotton from 45% to 0%. As a consequence, in 1998-99, cotton imports, particularly from the US, which heavily subsidises its cotton industry, jumped 12 times. In succeeding years, import duty was re-imposed and now stands at 10%. But it did not stop cheap imports from flooding in. This is because cotton is bought from farmers in Maharashtra at Rs 2,500 per quintal. At existing international prices, the landed value of cotton imported from the US of the same or similar variety is approximately Rs 1,500 per quintal as it is subsidised to the tune of Rs 3,800 per quintal.

The farmer is caught between not getting a good enough price for his produce and having to pay a higher price to cultivate it. The higher cost of Bt cotton seed that farmers are encouraged to buy also leads to higher costs in working the crop.

A study of farmers in some districts of Vidarbha showed that poor irrigation, spurious pesticides and the growing immunity of pests even to high-quality pesticides (for pests other than bollworm) have adversely affected cotton farming. The high cost of hybrid seeds has not been compensated by lower costs in other areas. With the state government not buying the cotton, and often delaying payment, many farmers are forced to incur debts. To pay off these debts they have had to sell their crop to traders or moneylenders.

INTERNATIONAL FACTORS THAT AFFECT COTTON FARMERS
The growing clout of international seed companies such as Monsanto, that has a firm grip on hybrid Bt cotton, is an alarming development. The company has now sub-licensed the Bt technology to other companies that are producing and marketing hybrid seeds to Indian farmers.

There is no independent verification of the claims made by these companies for their seeds. In allowing them to carry out and assess their own research, a precedent has been set for other companies to do the same. Farmers rely on the literature and advertisements that these companies provide. Owners of seed centres have also been co-opted by the seed companies. They are given incentives to push hybrid varieties over other seed varieties.

The US and the EU have repeatedly been hauled up before the WTO for their high cotton subsidies. In September 2004, a WTO dispute panel found that US$ 3.2 billion in annual cotton subsidies and US$ 1.6 billion in export credit paid by the US in cotton and other commodities were illegal under WTO rules. The case was brought by Brazil and supported by some West African cotton-producing countries (Benin and Chad). The US went in appeal in October 2004, but lost and has to implement the ruling.

Developing countries like India must have the political strength to continue to push for the cutting of subsidies in the EU and US during future negotiations, and ensure that the ruling is implemented.

Bilateral free trade agreements are another way in which trade is carried on. India is involved in several such agreements with various South Asian countries. Cotton farmers, however, have no knowledge of the agreements and have no say in framing the terms and conditions. While these agreements could open up new markets for Indian cotton, they may have an adverse impact on the livelihood of Indian farmers.

Adequate precautions must be taken in the area of rules of origin and, more importantly, in terms of listing products under various categories (those where tariffs are brought down quickly; those where tariffs are brought down more slowly; and those exempted from tariff slashing).

SOME SUGGESTIONS
The paper makes a strong case for empowering the marginal cotton farmer. He must be better informed and more involved in the production and trading of his crop. Very few small farmers in the Vidarbha region even keep records of how much they actually invest in cotton cultivation. Records of income and expenditure must be kept.

If a farmer is unable to understand the economics of her/his farm, decisions about future sowing and cultivation will depend on random calculations, or on the basis of what is seen to have worked on the farms of neighbours or relatives. Many farmers admit that they bought expensive hybrid seeds because they saw good results on a neighbouring farm, though the conditions may be dissimilar.

When farmers are sold bad seeds they have no way of getting compensation. If gram sabhas are invested with the authority of a seed court, they will provide an accessible grievance redressal system for farmers, and also a well informed one since they know the local conditions.

Civil society organisations must play a role in helping farmers understand these issues so that they can make informed decisions.
 
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